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strengthens, weakens, or leaves unchanged the effects of socioeconomic resources measured 
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Introduction
What is the primary role of voluntary associations for democracy? Do 
voluntary associations improve the quality of representative democracy? 
Voluntary associations undergird the creation and maintenance of 
democracy (Chambers and Kymlicka 2002; Cohen and Rogers 1995; Dahl 
1961; Gutmann 1998; Fukuyama 2016; Gutman 1998). Ever since Toqueville 
(2004 [1845]) observed that the strength of American democracy rested on 
the participation of ordinary citizens in associational activities and political 
affairs, a vast amount of studies have claimed that active involvement in 
politics by virtue of membership in voluntary associations contributes to the 
consolidation of democratic institutions and advances the equalization of 
political influences. 
Given that the privileged with higher education, more income, and 
higher social standing are more likely to participate in politics (Armingeon 
and Schädel 2015; Kim 2011; Lijphart 1997; Schlozman et al. 2005; Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), voluntary 
associations, as the most important players of civil society, have been 
depicted as helping the disadvantaged with lower education, less income, and 
lower social standing to overcome the barrier for engagement in democratic 
politics (Chambers 2002; Polletta 2002; Przeworski 2016; MR Warren 2001; 
Rosenblum 1998). They are identified, in the literature, as the most 
influential facilitators of political participation by inculcating civic resources 
such as a sense of civic duties and responsibility, social trust, civic skills, and 
political interest and efficacy (Achen and Hur 2011; Dagger 1997; Fukuyama 
1995; Kymlicka 1998; ME Warren 2001; Thorson 2012), by mobilizing 
money, time, and efforts (Gerber, Green, and Lamier 2008; Knoke 1990b; 
Leighley 1996; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), and by serving as the 
instrumental means for specific political interests and causes (Berry 1999; 
Burns 1994; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Baumgartner and Leech 
1998; Clemens 1997; Kaufman 1999; Tilly 1997). 
Implicit in these accounts is the assumption that voluntary associations 
may improve participatory equality by drawing people, especially the socially 
disadvantaged who lack necessary resources and access to politics, into the 
political arena beyond the level that their resources may allow. Put differently, 
it implies that associational membership can reduce the impact of individual 
resources such as educational attainment and family income on political 
participation at the individual level. Although voluntary associations are 
115Quality of Civil Society and Participatory Democracy in ISSP Countries
regarded as the means for expressing political voices of the disadvantaged in 
almost all democratic societies, surprisingly little empirical evidence exists to 
confirm the notion that associational membership is influential enough to 
overwhelm the effects of individual resources on political participation 
(Fernandes 2015; Fishman and Lizardo 2013). This equalizing effect of 
voluntary associations has been empirically untested indeed, it has been 
comparatively ignored except for the phenomenal study of Participation and 
Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison by Sidney Verba, Norman Nie, 
and Jea-on Kim (1978). Thus, we know very little about the extent to which 
associational membership modifies the impact of socioeconomic status on 
political activity, and even less about its varying consequences for 
participatory equality in diverse institutional settings today. 
What are the mechanisms by which voluntary associations lead to 
political equality or inequality? Under what circumstances will political 
inequality due to the unequal distribution of socioeconomic resources be 
reduced or intensified? Do consequences of voluntary associations for 
participatory democracy vary from country to country? Why do the cross-
national variations in the role of voluntary associations as a political equalizer 
occur? In this paper, I argue that voluntary associations are more at risk for 
intensifying political disparity in countries where they cannot inculcate civic 
resources in the mind of citizens.1 Without civic resources fostered through 
associational life, the inequality in political influence between the privileged 
and the disadvantaged will get deeper even among association members as 
the effects of the other two factors of political mobilization and interest 
pursuit on political participation get stronger. Two processes by which 
associational activity ends up deepening participatory inequality are 
elaborated in countries where civic resources cannot be developed by 
voluntary association. First, when political participation is instrumentally 
determined, the privileged with higher education and more income are more 
likely to detect and exploit rewarding opportunities to project their 
preferences and demands into political decision. This tendency can be 
explained by the fact that the privileged not only receive more returns from 
1 As suggested in my previous paper (Kim 2011), “by civic resources and politically desirable 
traits, I mean the attitudinal attributes such as civic virtue and social trust relevant to participation in 
civic and political affairs. On the one hand, trusting citizens will be less likely to engage in 
opportunistic behavior, rather, they are more likely to participate in politics to enrich their 
surroundings because they comply with the requirements of democratic practice based on the belief 
that others will also comply. On the other hand, virtuous citizens will be the ones who regard 
political participation as a necessary contribution to the good of the community (Kim 2011: 127).
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political action, but also have quality connections with political elites or 
public officials who can exert their influence on the policy-making process 
(Lake and Huckfeldt 1998; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Second, when 
the decision to participate stems mainly from strategic mobilization by 
parties and political organizations, this also results in the aggravation of 
participatory disparity because the request for political action tends to target 
people who occupy the upper social strata (Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 
1999; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 30-31; Schier 2000: 7-41; Skocpol 2003, 
2004). As a combined result of rent-seeking political action by association 
members and mobilization efforts by political recruiters, voluntary 
associations can hardly reduce participatory inequality in such countries 
where voluntary associations cannot function as a civic educator. 
Using the 2004 ISSP datasets, this paper attempts to shed light on 
varying consequences of voluntary associations for participatory democracy 
in socially, politically, and culturally different contexts from a comparative 
perspective. To this end, this paper investigates whether associational 
membership strengthens, weakens, or leaves unchanged the effects of 
socioeconomic resources measured by educational attainment and family 
income on political participation especially among association members in 
each country. In short, this paper examines the hypothesis that the effects of 
educational attainment and family income on political participation among 
members are better constrained in countries where voluntary associations 
can inculcate civic resources than those in countries where they cannot. By 
doing so, it fills the gap in the empirical research on the role of voluntary 
associations as an equalizer of political influences. Furthermore, by 
conducting a comparative study, this paper provides empirical grounds for 
the question of whether identical or contrasting settings of civil society lead 
to similar or dissimilar foundations of participatory democracy. 
Social Inequality, Political Inequality, and Voluntary 
Associations as Equalizing Forces
Social inequality and political inequality go hand in hand in that those who 
have more socioeconomic resources tend to participate more in politics than 
those who have less (Erikson 2015). The educated and the affluent are more 
likely to possess knowledge that makes it easier to sort out the intricacies of 
political procedure, cognitive abilities that can process complex political 
information, and social skills that help interact smoothly with others (Jacobs 
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and Skocpol 2005: 31-32; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996: 11-38; Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone 1982). They also have expansive personal networks closer to 
the center of far-flung political information and opportunities. In contrast, 
the networks of the less affluent and the less educated are more likely to be 
encapsulated and localized such that they fail to provide much diversity and 
richness in political information and opportunities (Burt 2005; Granovetter 
1973; Fisher 1982; Huckfeldt, Plutzer, and Sprangue 1993; Lake and 
Huckfeldt 1998; Laumann 1973; Wellman 1978). Overall, the privileged 
participate more in politics than the disadvantaged. It appears to be inevitable 
that inequality in socioeconomic resources leads to inequality in political 
voices. “In terms of whose concerns are expressed, it matters who participates 
because the preferences and demands of participants will be better 
represented in the policy process” (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995: 227). 
If the messages to policymakers are skewed in favor of the educated and the 
affluent, then the democratic principles of equal responsiveness to all will be 
compromised.2 
While the prediction about equal political influence in conjunction with 
the unequal distribution of socioeconomic resources paints a grim picture, 
scholars in social science have placed great hope in the role of voluntary 
associations to equalize political voice across lines of education and income 
(Jacobs and Skocpol 2005: 49-57). By articulating the preferences and 
demands of citizens and establishing effective channels by which various 
political voices can be heard, voluntary associations decrease the impact of 
educational attainment and family income on political participation at the 
individual level, thereby leading to greater political equality at the societal 
level. Many sociologists and political scientists have believed that the 
derivatives of associational life can compete with individual socioeconomic 
variables in determining the level of political activity.3 
2 Needless to say, a high participation rate in a given country does not necessarily warrant that 
participatory democracy will flourish. Participation is one thing democracy is another. However, it is 
certain that political participation from a wider section of population is essential to participatory 
democracy in the sense that the demand of ordinary citizens can be best represented in the policy 
process when they participate actively in politics. Democracy will become fragile or superficial if 
voting is the only form of political practice (Muller and Seligson 1994). 
3 See Fung (2003) for the review of the roles of voluntary associations for participatory 
democracy. He acknowledges that there is no consensus on the ways in which associations 
contribute among scholars. He instead recapitulates the ways that voluntary associations enhance 
democracy: through the intrinsic value of associational life, fostering civic virtue and teaching 
political skills, offering resistance to power and checking government, improving the quality and 
equality of representation, facilitating public deliberation, and creating opportunities for citizens and 
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Broadly speaking, the side benefits of associational membership found 
in the existing empirical research, which eventually rival the impacts of 
socioeconomic resources on political participation, can be classified three 
ways.4 
Firstly, associations instill psychological resources critical for political 
action in the mind of citizens. They are imbued with civic virtue (Grönlund, 
Setälä, & Herne 2010. Galston 1991; Frisco, Muller, and Dodson 2004; 
Krishna 2002; Letki 2004; Pykett & Schaefer 2010), norms of reciprocity and 
generalized trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Fennema and Tillie 1999; Lake and 
Huckfeldt 1998), and other communication skills and political orientations 
(Ayala 2000; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Brady, Verba, and Scholzman 1995; 
Green and Brook 2005; Paulsen 1991; Pollock 1982), and are thus more likely 
to participate in politics. Members are motivated to take political action 
beyond the level that their resources permit as they obtain subjective civic 
competence and trust of others through cooperative work. ME Warren 
(2001) maintains that voluntary associations contribute to democracy in a 
way that they have developmental effects on citizens such as boosting 
political efficacy, serving as collectors, organizers, and conduits of political 
information, teaching political skills, and developing civic virtue including 
norms of reciprocity and generalized trust. In particular, democratic 
institutions become more transparent, accountable, and systematic as much 
as ordinary citizens possess social trust and civic virtues because they 
stimulate more political involvement. 
Secondly, associations directly and indirectly operate as a nexus of 
political mobilization. It is no doubt that associational membership enhances 
the quantity and quality of social networks. Social ties strengthened and 
enlarged through the membership give people access to a wide range of 
political opportunities (Crenson 1978; Erickson and Nosanchuk 1990; 
Leighley 1995; Mutz 2002a, 2002b; Teorell 2003; Weatherford 1982; Zipp and 
Smith 1979). Such ties disseminate political information and mobilize 
sentiment, which eventually increase the probability of political participation 
groups to participate directly in governance (Fung 2003: 518-29).
4 People do not join voluntary associations in order to gain civic resources or get involved in 
politics. Instead, they learn civic attitudes and get exposed to political information and opportunities 
in the course of meeting personally and socially valuable ends. Moreover, the primary aims of most 
associations are neither to teach members civic attitudes nor to encourage them to take part in 
politics. Actually, association-based political action is very much a minority affair (Ulzurrun 2002; 
Moyser and Parry 1997). In this sense, it is appropriate to regard civic virtue and social trust as 
byproducts or side benefits trained and reinforced in associational activities independent of the 
explicit purpose that specific associations serve (Gutman 1998: 4). 
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(Abramson and Claggett 2001; Gould 1991; Knoke 1990a; McAdam 1986; 
McClurg 2003, 2005; Smith and Zipp 1983; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-
Olson 1980). Members in voluntary associations are more likely to participate 
in politics because they are accessible and susceptible to mobilization 
(Rosenston and Hansen 1993: 83-88). On the one hand, voluntary 
associations are direct agents of mobilization. Group leaders, parties, and 
political activists induce members to participate in politics. They contact and 
request members to support their cause in particular issues and to give votes, 
money, and time. On the other hand, even when associational activities are 
not directly related to politics, the politically meaningful contacts are most 
likely and frequently to occur in the context of voluntary associations 
(Abramson and Claggett 2001; Huckfeldt et al. 1995). Thus, members in 
apolitical associations such as sport clubs are also exposed to political stimuli 
such as political discussion over community matters, candidates, and 
campaign and eventually recruited into political action (Erickson and 
Nosanchuk 1990). In sum, members in voluntary associations are given 
information about the issues at stake and the opportunities to affect them. 
The mobilization process within voluntary association thus helps citizens 
overcome hurdles caused by the lack of socioeconomic resources. 
Thirdly, membership can be used as an instrumental tool for raising 
political voices. Members may utilize their membership as a channel for 
expressing their political views to politicians and for pressing their demands 
in the policymaking process (Goldberg 1996; Moyser and Parry 1997; Tilly 
1997). As Madison (1788) and Tocqueville (2004[1845]) regarded 
associational membership as the single best means of assuring the representation 
of privatized group interests, it is somehow natural to assume that people 
form and enter voluntary associations to expand and sustain their political 
influence and power. In fact, all types of voluntary associations have a huge 
political stake in local and national politics (Kaufman 2002: 85-100). For 
instance, mercantile and commercial associations provide businessmen with 
valuable private forums to share information, negotiable deals, sway 
policymaking process, and form exclusive cartels (Burns 1994). On the other 
hand, voluntary associations channel the voices of the disadvantaged into the 
political decision by helping them to actively get involved in politics. For 
example, politically underrepresented groups such as blacks, immigrants, and 
women also found organizations of their own (Clemens 1997; Skocpol 1992). 
These organizations serve the minority groups as a vital political vehicle for 
the communication and articulation of their social and political concerns. 
Thus, voluntary associations are expected to create arenas in which their 
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members articulate demands for specific policies, to take political action, and 
then to influence political outcomes. These three mechanisms implicitly 
claim that voluntary associations improve participatory equality by drawing 
people, especially the socially disadvantaged who lack necessary resources 
and access to politics, into the political arena beyond the level that their 
resources may allow. Namely, the byproducts or side benefits of associational 
life may interfere with the extent to which socioeconomic resources 
determine the level of political activity. Therefore, associational membership 
can reduce the impact of individual resources such as educational attainment 
and family income on political participation. 
Voluntary associations always increase political participation in any 
context. However, the prevailing factors that link associational membership 
with political activity vary from country to country (Koopmans 2004; Paxton 
2002; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). The most notable is that whereas the 
effectiveness of membership as a political mobilizer and an instrumental 
vehicle is found to be consistent across countries, the extent to which they 
foster the politically desirable traits, particularly civic virtue and social trust, 
is not (Booth and Richard 1998; Gambetta 1993, 1998; Ulzurrun 2002; 
Freitag 2003; Krishna 2002; Labigne, 2012; Muller and Seligson 1994; Newton 
1999: 170-4, 2001; Stolle and Rochon 1998). Hence, it is possible to think of 
civic virtue and social trust as the intermediaries making common vibrant 
associational cultures result in differential consequences for participatory 
equality among countries. Given that associational membership facilitates 
individual political engagement and thus diminishes the political disparity 
between the privileged and disadvantaged(Ahlquist and Levi 2013), if we find 
a weakness in its role as an equalizing force in some countries, the lack of 
capacity to generate civic virtue and social trust could be the culprit.5
 
5 Paxton (2002) argues that voluntary associations help maintain democracy by affecting both the 
quantity and quality of political participation by citizens. Quantity refers to the amount of political 
participation engendered by membership in voluntary associations. Quality means the nature of 
political participation. The quality is high when participation is based on the democratic 
dispositions of civic virtue and social trust. Therefore, she unwittingly acknowledges that the 
combination of quantity and quality of participation through associational membership can only 
make democracy feasible. In other words, the cultivation of democratic dispositions is indispensable 
to the improvement of participatory democracy (Paxton 2002: 258-9).  
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How Political Disparity can be Intensified by Voluntary 
Associations
The process through which voluntary associations without capacity to 
produce civic resources exacerbate political disparity is rather straightforward 
to describe. As was illustrated earlier, associational membership elevates the 
level of political activity and brings forth participatory equality in three ways: 
1) By cultivating politically desirable traits including civic virtue and social 
trust, 2) by furthering political mobilization, 3) by furnishing efficient 
channels for diverse political voices. Remember that, among these three 
participatory factors derived from membership, only the cultivation of civic 
virtue and social trust has been found to be inconsistent across countries. In 
my view, therefore, if the membership merely increases political participation 
without developing civic virtue and social trust, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that it does so by furthering mobilization and serving as a political 
vehicle. When one of the three is absent, the relevance of the other two grows. 
That is, increased political participation should be mostly attributable to the 
second and the third of the three factors above. Furthermore, I argue that 
political disparity between the privileged and the disadvantaged due to the 
differences in socioeconomic resources will not be diminished if political 
participation among members is only driven by the pursuit of their own 
benefits or in reaction to the requests from those who belong to the 
community with which they identify. How is this corollary possible? 
The notion that associational activities may only represent divisive group 
interests and thus promote factionalism as opposed to civic resources is 
consistent with the picture envisioned in the Federalist No. 10 written by 
James Madison (1788). In that paper, he describes voluntary associations as a 
political means for raising and realizing factional interests. Thus, political 
participation of association members is confined to their financial and 
political interests in the fiscal policy of government (Kaufman 1999). When 
associational membership mainly functions as an instrumental tool to secure 
greater leverage in the polity, those from the upper segments of society are 
more likely to take advantage of any available rewarding opportunities than 
those from the lower ones. As Wuthnow (2004) points out, the privileged 
who are well-endowed with a variety of kinds of resources participate more 
in politics than do the disadvantaged because they not only have access to the 
right information and channels, but have more direct and greater stakes in 
politics, suggesting that they have more incentives to take political action. 
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Consequently, the distribution of political activities and their benefits tend to 
be skewed in favor of the rich, the powerful, and the educated (Schlozman et 
al. 2005). On the other hand, the participatory gap also exists among 
associations because each may have different levels of available resources and 
organizational capacity (Walzer 2002: 39-41). Needless to say, associations 
composed of high-status members are more likely to overcome the hurdles 
posed by the logic of collective action than less resource-rich associations of 
similar size and a similar intensity of concerns. Resource-poor associations 
are less effective in helping members to tap into the flow of political 
opportunities, which may reinforce indifference among members toward 
civic engagement. Furthermore, participatory inequality tends to be durable 
through the exclusive networking of well-endowed associations (Tilly 1997). 
Members in those associations monopolize political information and 
channels, thereby amassing and reproducing their wealth and social standing 
(Useem 1984). As Skocpol (1999) worries, the political voices of well-
endowed associations will prevail in the policy process and thus social 
inequality will be noticeably aggravated by the very existence of voluntary 
associations.
It is well known that the mobilization process is most effective in 
equalizing political influences between socioeconomic levels because it 
provides all citizens the chance to participate in politics regardless of their 
wealth or social standing (Leighley 1996; Rosenston and Hansen 1993; Verba, 
Nie, and Kim 1978). Political mobilization within associations is expected to 
mitigate the political disparity that the difference in individual resources 
would give rise to. Thus, the likelihood to participate escalates as members 
are invited by political actors such as group leaders, party activists, and group 
operatives. However, it seems unrealistic to presuppose that the chance to be 
mobilized is evenly distributed within associations. It might be more 
reasonable to assume that political mobilization is directed more at the 
privileged than at the disadvantaged (Hill and Leighley 1994; Rosenstone and 
Hansen 1993: 30-31; Schier 2000: 7-41). In actuality, as Verba, Scholozman, 
and Brady (1995) show, the white, the affluent, and the well-educated receive 
more requests to participate than do the black, the poor, and the less 
educated. From the viewpoint of political recruiters, the strategy of targeted 
mobilization in terms of socioeconomic status is extremely rational in the 
sense that it pursues the greatest effect with the least effort. They must 
carefully identify and motivate the particular segments of the public most 
likely to be active for particular issues to maximize the efficiency of their 
mobilization (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 20-37). Thus, political recruiters 
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tend to contact members with higher income and more education, as they are 
the most likely prospects to be actual participants. In addition, the odds of 
being requested may increase as the higher education and income place 
themselves at the central positions of social and political networks, a good 
indicative of an effective dissemination of political information and a strong 
political influence to others (McClurg 2004). In a similar vein, the differences 
in socioeconomic resources among associations also intensify the 
stratification of political participation because the recruiters target the ones 
composed of members with higher social and economic status (Brady, 
Schlozman, and Verba 1999; Abramson and Claggett 2001). Thus, political 
stimuli such as information about politics and requests to participate are 
circulated differentially among associations. It is less likely for members in 
the resource-poor associations to have an equal chance to be offered those 
stimuli as much as are those in well-endowed ones (Berman 1997; Riley 2005; 
Wuthnow 1991). In short, by making political participation possible “by 
invitation only”, the mobilization serves to reinforce political disparity (Hill 
and Leighley 1994; Schier 2000). Participatory inequality worsens and 
becomes perpetuated by the fact that members with more resources and 
members in well-endowed associations are much more likely to be in the 
middle of the mobilization process. Paradoxically, even political mobilization, 
known as the most decisive reducer of participation disparity, widens rather 
than narrows the gap in political influences between the socially and 
economically privileged and the disadvantaged. Therefore, in the absence of 
civic resources, voluntary associations exacerbate rather than mitigate 
political disparity between the privileged and the disadvantaged (Fishman 
2016). Basically, I believe that the increased political activity via associational 
membership may actually do more harm than good for democracy, if not 
elicited by civic resources. 
Data and Methods
Measures
The 2004 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) citizenship module 
data are analyzed to compare the role of voluntary associations in 36 
countries in achieving participatory democracy. The 2004 ISSP includes 
various topics about citizens’ civic attitudes and political identities as well as 
their social and political activities. Furthermore, the 2004 ISSP module asks 
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whether respondents belong to four types of voluntary associations, 
including (1) Labor Union, Business, or Professional Association; (2) Sports, 
Leisure, or Cultural Group; (3) Church-Affiliated Group; (4) Other Groups. 
An index of political participation, which will serve as a dependent 
variable in the analysis, was constructed by adding the number of self-
reported political acts in which respondents engaged at least once in the last 
twelve months. The 2004 ISSP includes the battery of political acts asking 
whether a respondent signed a petition, boycotted products for social or 
political reasons, took part in a demonstration, attended a political rally, 
contacted officials or politicians to express one’s opinion, donated money, 
contacted media, or involved in internet political forum in the past year.6 Thus, 
it is an additive index with each counted as one act, an eight-point scale for 
overall political participation. This index, though not exhaustive, captures 
essential dimensions of political behaviors derived from private motivations 
to communal causes. 
An index of civic virtue is constructed by adding the ten items asking 
citizens’ attitudes about civic duties, liberal virtue, and civility that encourage 
individual political involvement. Respondents were asked to give a score 
between 1 (Strongly Disagree) and 7 (Strongly Agree) for each item, so the 
index ranges from a minimum of 7 to a maximum of 70. The battery of civic 
virtue questions asks how important each of ten items is including Always 
vote in elections, Never try to evade taxes, Always to obey laws and regulations, 
To keep watch on the actions of government, To be active in social or political 
associations, To try to understand the reasoning of people with other opinions, 
To choose products for political, ethical or environmental reasons, even if they 
cost a bit more, To help people in our country who are worse off than yourself, 
To help people in the rest of the world who are worse off than yourself, To be 
willing to serve in the military at a time of need is to be a good citizen. Social 
trust is measured by a four point scale asking “Generally speaking, would you 
say that people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people?” The ranges of possible responses are 1: You almost always can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people, 2: You usually can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people, 3: People can usually be trusted, 4: People can almost always be trusted. 
Educational attainment and family income are adopted as measures for 
socioeconomic resources in that they represent the critical sources for 
6 Employing an additive scale for overall political participation as a dependent variable rather 
than constructing eight different models for individual political acts would be more appropriate in 
the interest of conducting a comparative study because some concepts of the same political acts vary 
in meaning across countries (Kim 2011: 135).  
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political life such as money, social standing, and civic skills (Nie, Junn, and 
Stehlik-Barry 1996; Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1980). Based on the degree 
that respondents received, education is collapsed into four categories of “less 
than high school diploma”, “high school diploma”, “some college”, and “college 
diploma or more.” I set “less than high school diploma” as a reference 
category. Family income is also aggregated into five groups of “the lowest 
quartile”, “the second quartile”, “the third quartile”, “the top quartile”, and 
“missing (don’t know/refused).” The missing category is included not only 
because its number is substantially high for both countries, but also because it 
possibly reflect certain characteristics of respondents. “The lowest quartile” is 
the reference. Some background characteristics such as age, race, gender, 
marital status, working status, religious denomination, parental status 
indicating presence of children under age eighteen who need parental care, 
region of residence, and type of community, are included as controls in all 
models of this paper
Methods 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 are histograms for the distribution of the political 
participation index in the United States and Korea. Figures indicate that the 
data are strongly skewed to the right and are not normally distributed for all 
groups. Thus, the figures suggest that OLS regression would be inappropriate. 
The typical strategy to handle this type of count data is to use the Poisson 
Regression Model (King 1989). In the Poisson distribution, however, the 
variance of the dependent variable equals its mean. In other words, this 
model assumes that people with the same independent variables are expected 
to have the same number of events, which is not realistic because actual data 
are always under- or over-dispersed. In this case, it is widely recommended to 
use a negative binomial regression model.
Voluntary associations improve participatory democracy by reducing 
the impact of socioeconomic resources on political participation in three 
ways. Among three participatory factors stemming from associational 
activities, only the development of civic virtue and social trust is not 
consistent across countries whereas political mobilization by political 
recruiters and interest pursuit by members are found to be constant in the 
comparative research. Hence, I will first explore the ability of voluntary 
associations to produce civic virtue and social trust. It enables us to 
conjecture whether voluntary associations function as a “school for 
democracy” and eventually mitigate participatory inequality in each country.
126 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY, Vol. 45 No. 1, June 2016
Second, in order for my argument about intensification of political 
inequality to be justifiable, voluntary associations should enhance political 
activity in any context. Thus, it is critical to confirm whether voluntary 
associations really increase political participation. By running a negative 
binomial regression of political acts on associational membership, I attempt 
to verify the significant relationship between associational membership and 
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political participation in all ISSP countries. I assume that voluntary associations 
likely intensify political disparity where they draw members into political 
action without fostering civic virtue and social trust. Without such civic 
resources, the inequality in political voices across socioeconomic lines gets 
deeper even among association members as the effects of other two factors of 
political mobilization and interest pursuit on political participation get stronger.
Finally, instead of searching similar or different conditions among ISSP 
countries or constructing a general framework explaining the cross-national 
variations, I try to verify the hypothesis that voluntary associations increase 
or reduce political inequality depending on their capacity to inculcate civic 
resources in the mind of citizens. In order to see how socioeconomic 
resources interact with the context of voluntary association, I split the sample 
into members and nonmembers and run a negative binomial regression for 
members in each country. Members are those who belong to one or more 
voluntary associations while nonmembers are those who belong to none. 
Special attention will be given to the effects of educational attainment and 
family income on the number of political acts among members. Specifically, 
given that associational membership facilitates political participation in all 
countries, I hypothesize that the effects of socioeconomic resources among 
members are weaker in countries where voluntary associations inculcate civic 
virtue and social trust than those in countries where they cannot develop 
such civic traits. Incident rate ratios for the number of political acts rather 
than the difference in the number of political acts will be calculated 
effectively to show the cross-national variations.
Results 
Effect of associational membership on civic resources in 36 ISSP countries
Table 1 classifies voluntary associations of 36 ISSP countries into four groups, 
excluding Denmark and Mexico, according to their capacities to produce 
civic resources.7 To obtain the list, I ran two OLS regression of civic virtue 
and social trust for each country, controlling for socioeconomic resources 
and other variables. This two-by-two table is constructed based on the effect 
of associational membership on two dependent variables at the 0.05 
7 Denmark (96.1%) and Mexico (93.5%) will be eliminated in the analyses that follow because 
their membership rate is so high that we cannot expect its discernible effect on any variables of 
interest in this section.
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significance level. If voluntary associations have a significant impact on both 
civic virtue and social trust, I put these cases in the upper left cell of Table 5 
(Group I). In contrast, if associational membership affects neither civic virtue 
nor social trust, these cases are located in the lower right cell (Group IV). The 
countries whose voluntary associations affect either civic virtue or social trust 
are placed in upper right or lower left cells, (Group II or III), respectively. 
Table 1 shows that association members in Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Finland, France, Japan, Latvia, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, US, and 
Venezuela have greater civic virtue and social trust compared to nonmembers, 
indicating that voluntary associations produce civic resources in these 
countries. In contrast, associational membership in Austria, Cyprus, 
Hungary, Korea, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, and Uruguay 
fosters neither civic virtue nor social trust.8 Given that voluntary associations 
increase political participation in any context and that the two other 
participatory factors of political mobilization by political recruiters and 
instrumental pursuit of members are consistent across countries, the 
equalizing role of voluntary associations should depend on their capacity to 
develop civic resources. Therefore, voluntary associations are expected to 
diminish the effects of socioeconomic resources on political participation in 
countries classified as Group I in Table 1. On the other hand, voluntary 
associations may result in the aggravation of political disparity in countries in 
Group IV. In short, it is expected that the effects of socioeconomic resources 
on political participation among members will be stronger and more 
significant in countries in Group IV than those in Group I.
Judging from the rationale that the cultivation of civic resources by 
voluntary associations determines their success as an political equalizer, 
countries located in Group II and Group III such as Czech Republic, Ireland, 
Poland, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Bulgaria, Great Britain, Flanders, Israel, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, and Taiwan shows a moderate tendency that the 
effects of socioeconomic resources on political participation among members 
are stronger than those in Group I and that they are weaker than those in 
Group IV. In my view, however, they are likely to be closer to countries in 
Group I in that associational membership significantly affects at least one of 
the two civic resource variables in those countries. 
8 Brazil and Portugal are classified in Group IV despite their voluntary associations having 
significant impact on either civic virtue or social trust. It is because their significant effects on social 
trust in Brazil and on civic virtue in Portugal are negative. 
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TABLE 1









US, Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Finland, France, Germany, 








Bulgaria, Great Britain, 
Flanders, Israel, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Taiwan
Group IV
Korea, Austria, Brazil†, 
Cyprus, Hungary, 
Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal††, Russia, Slovenia 
† Associational membership significantly and negatively affects social trust
††Associational membership significantly and negatively affects civic virtue
Effect of associational membership on political participation in 36 ISSP 
countries 
Figure 3 displays incidence rate ratios of association members to 
nonmembers for the number of political acts in 36 ISSP countries. The 
incidence rate ratios for all countries are significant at the 0.05 significance 
level. Incidence rate ratio rather than difference in the number of political 
acts is estimated from the coefficients of negative binomial regression results, 
which is standardized and appropriate for a cross-national comparison. The 
significance level test and differences in the number of political acts between 
categories are not sufficient to simultaneously compare the results of many 
countries. The simple difference in counts is hardly intuitive because the 
relative importance of one political act varies from country to country. In 
short, it is neither direct nor standardized. For example, members in Great 
Britain and Australia report 0.36 and 0.52 more political acts compared to 
9 See Appendix 1 for the example of analysis on the United States and Korea.
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nonmembers, respectively. At a glance, the effect of associational 
membership on political participation seems stronger in Australia than in 
Great Britain. According to Figure 3, however, the incidence rate ratios for 
both countries are identical, meaning that members compared to 
nonmembers, while holding the other variables constant in the models, are 
expected to have the same rate of 1.60 times greater for political acts. Thus, 
incidence rate ratios allow us to make a direct comparison of cross-national 
variations than difference in the number of political acts. 
Does associational membership always boost the level of political 
activity in all countries? Mere membership in voluntary associations 
positively and significantly affects political participation in all ISSP 
countries.10 The results suggest that voluntary associations facilitate political 
participation by furthering political mobilization and serving as a political 
vehicle even when their educating function is lacking in many countries. 
Note that among the three participatory factors elicited by associational 
activities, civic resource-related variables are only included in the model 
because the other two factors are not available in the 2004 ISSP data. Thus, 
the significant impact of associational membership on political participation 
in each country largely reflects the influence of political mobilization by 
political recruiters and interest pursuit of members. Therefore, the political 
disparity between the privileged and the disadvantaged among members are 
likely to be intensified where civic virtue and social trust are not cultivated 
but political activities are increased by associational membership. 
Figure 3 indicates that almost all countries in Group IV, with the 
exception of Austria, Slovenia, and Poland, are ranked in the top third on the 
incidence rate ratio of members to nonmembers for the number of political 
acts. In contrast, the incidence rate ratios are below 2.00 in all countries in 
Group I though they are statistically significant. For example, members in 
Russia are expected to report political acts in the last year 3.04 times more 
than nonmembers, while it is just 1.39 times in Switzerland. Since substantial 
part of the associational membership’s impact on political participation is 
composed of political mobilization and interest pursuit, Figure 3 implies that 
political participation is more influenced by the other two participatory 
factors in countries in Group IV than in countries in Group I. In addition, 
the results of other analyses, though not reported in this paper, also confirm 
10 As expected, associational membership significantly affects neither political participation nor 
civic resource in Denmark and Mexico where more than 90 per cent of population belong to 
voluntary associations. The results of negative binomial regression for entire population are virtually 
the same as those for association members in both countries. 
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that the effects of civic virtue and social trust on political participation are 
consistently significant and strong in Group I countries whereas they are 
meager and weak in Group IV countries.
All in all, political activities in Group I countries are shaped by all three 
participatory factors via associational activities while they are mainly 








































































 Fig. 3.—Incidence Rate Ratio of Members to Nonmembers for the Number of 
Political Acts in 36 ISSP Countries
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countries. Therefore, I conclude that the effects of socioeconomic resources 
on political participation among members are stronger in Korea, Austria, 
Brazil, Cyprus, Hungary, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, and Slovenia 
compared to those in the United States, Australia, Canada, Chile, Finland, 
France, Germany, Japan, Latvia, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, Venezuela, and 
Uruguay. I also expect that the effects of socioeconomic resources on political 
participation among members in Group II and Group III countries are 
similar to those in Group I countries. It is not only because voluntary 
associations in these countries significantly and moderately increase the level 
of political activity, but also because civic virtue and social trust are better 
created by voluntary associations than are they in Group IV countries. 
Members in voluntary associations in Group IV countries are most at risk for 
political inequality between the privileged and the disadvantaged.
Varying consequences of voluntary associations for participatory democracy in 
36 ISSP Countries
Do educational attainment and family income equally influence political 
participation? Previous studies point out that these two most important 
measures of socioeconomic resources differentially affect the level of political 
activity. It is well known that the effect of educational attainment compared 
to family income is found to be more consistent and stronger in many 
countries (Leighley 1995; Verba, Schlozman, Brady 1995). It is certain that 
education and income have differential impacts on political participation in 
many countries. Thus, it is necessary to treat education and income 
separately when discussing the effects of socioeconomic resources on 
political participation. I will probe how they work differently and 
distinctively in affecting the level of political activity among association 
members in the analyses that follow. 
Figure 4 is a graph showing incident rate ratios of all educational 
categories to the reference category among association members for the 
number of political acts in countries in Group I and Group IV. A reference of 
“less than high school” is set at 1 on the graph. Each value on the graph 
indicates an incident rate ratio of each educational category to the reference 
for the number of political acts. Dotted lines represent incidence rate ratios 
for Group IV countries while solid lines stand for Group I countries. Among 
countries in Group I, it appears that incidence rate ratios of all educational 
categories, with the exception of the highest category in Norway, Finland, and 
Latvia, are all below 2.00. The difference in political participation between 
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 Fig. 4.Incidence Rate Ratio of Educational Attainment for the Number of Political 
Acts among Association Members in Countries at Group I and Group IV11
different educational categories among members is relatively slight in these 
countries. On the other hand, among countries in Group IV, a line of 
incidence rate ratios on the graph, with the exception of the Philippines and 
Portugal, is fluctuating from one to another educational category within 
countries. It suggests that political participation among members is much 
affected by educational attainment in these countries.
Figure 4 clearly indicates that the incidence rate ratios of higher 
educational categories to the reference among members are generally higher 
in Group IV countries than in Group I countries. For example, members with 
“high school diploma,” “some college,” and “college graduate or more” 
compared to “less than high school diploma” in Poland, while holding other 
variable constant, are expected to have a rate 3.60, 3.42, and 2.69 times higher 
for the number of political acts. The corresponding numbers for the Australia 
are 1.02, 1.32, and 1.44. Figure 4 exhibits that the effects of educational 
attainment on political participation among members are weaker in countries 
where civic virtue and social trust are developed through associational 
activities (solid lines) than in countries where such civic resources are not 
created (dotted lines). Therefore, judged from the remarkable differences in 
the effects of educational attainment on political participation between two 
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groups of countries, the results imply that voluntary associations better 
improve participatory democracy in countries in Group I than in countries in 
Group IV. The results support my hypothesis that voluntary associations can 
reduce political inequality depending on their capacity to produce civic virtue 
and social trust.
The consequences of family income for political equality among 
members are less convincing compared to those of educational attainment. 
Furthermore, it comes as a surprise that no differences in the effects of family 
income between higher quartiles and the lowest quartile are found in almost 
all countries. The incidence rate ratios are all virtually 1.00, suggesting no 
difference in the effect of family income on political participation exists in 
those countries. Though not conspicuous, nevertheless, Figure 5 shows that 
family income are more influential on political participation among members 
in countries in Group IV than those in Group I. Specifically, the levels of 
political activity among association members in Portugal, Poland, Hungary, 
and Korea are more likely to be shaped by family income than those in other 
countries on Figure 5. For example, members in the second, the third, and 
the top in family income in Portugal are 1.16, 1.68, and 3.33 more times likely 
to participate in politics than those in the lowest income quartile. In Finland, 
the corresponding numbers are 1.05, 0.83, and 0.91, controlling for the effects 
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 Fig. 5.—Incidence Rate Ratio of Family Income for the Number of Political Acts 
among Association Members in Countries at Group I and Group IV
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political inequality due to the unequal distribution of income are more likely 
to be mitigated by voluntary associations in countries where civic virtue and 
social trust are fostered by associational activities than in countries where 
they are not.
Figure 6 is a graph displaying incident rate ratios of all higher educational 
categories to the lowest category among members for the number of political 
acts in countries in Group II and Group III of Table 5. Dotted lines represent 
incidence rate ratios for countries in Group II while solid lines stand for 
countries in Group III. No actual difference in the effect of educational 
attainment on political participation among members is found between 
Group II and Group III. Actually, the impact of education in these groups of 
countries is quite similar with that in Group I countries. The incidence rate 
ratios of all higher educational categories compared to the lowest category for 
political acts range from 1.00 to 2.00 with some exceptions such as Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic and Ireland. 12 When compared to countries in Group IV, 
however, educational attainment is less likely to affect political participation 
among members of countries in Group II and III. In general, voluntary 
associations tend to equalize political influences across socioeconomic lines 
12 I will not scrutinize the highest incidence rate ratios of all educational categories in Bulgaria. 
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 Fig. 6.—Incidence Rate Ratio of Educational Attainment for the Number of 
Political Acts among Association Members in Countries at Group II and Group III
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in these countries. Results suggest, therefore, that participatory inequality 
caused by the difference in educational attainment can be reduced by 
voluntary associations as long as they can develop either civic virtue or social 
trust. 
As shown in Figure 7, the effects of family income on political 
participation among members are almost identical with those of educational 
attainment in countries in Group II and Group III. Compared to countries in 
Group I and Group IV, however, the patterns of influence by family income 
differ from those of educational attainment. The incidence rate ratios of 
higher income quartiles to the bottom quartile among members are higher in 
Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Taiwan than those in 
countries in Group I. It suggests that political inequality due to unequal 
distribution of income is less likely to be mitigated by associational 
membership in some countries in Group II and III compared to that in 
countries in Group I. On the other hand, Figure 7 indicates that the effects of 
family
income on political participation are more constrained by associational 
membership in countries in Group II and Group III compared to countries in 
Group IV. Therefore, the results reveal that voluntary associations in 
countries in Group II and III are less likely to facilitate participatory 
democracy than those in countries where both civic virtue and social trust 
 Fig. 7.—Incidence Rate Ratio of Family Income for the Number of Political Acts 
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are developed through associational activities (Group I) and more likely to do 
so than those in countries where they are not (Group IV).13
Discussion
In this paper, I hypothesize that political disparity between the privileged and 
the disadvantaged can be reduced by voluntary associations depending on 
their capacity to facilitate civic virtue and social trust. Specifically, the effects 
of education and income on political participation among members were 
better constrained in countries where civic virtue and social trust were 
developed by associational membership compared to those in countries 
where such civic resources are not. 
Though not perfect, the results from the analyses of 36 ISSP countries 
support my hypothesis that political disparity between the privileged and the 
disadvantaged will be reduced by voluntary associations depending on their 
capacity to develop civic virtue and social trust. The results in this paper 
make us skeptical of what has been practically conventional wisdom that 
there is always a positive relationship between vigorous associational activity 
and participatory democracy. Under certain circumstances, associational 
activities and political equality can be reversely correlated. Accordingly, this 
paper also questions a longstanding belief in the social sciences that 
voluntary associations in all contexts function as a school for democracy, a 
civic organizer, and an agent of political equality (Kim 2011). 
To be fair, it should be noted that, in the developed democracies, 
voluntary associations amplify political influence of those who already have 
socioeconomic resources because they are able to more effectively associate, 
which in turn help them accumulate their wealth and power (Hicks and 
Swank 1992; Skocpol 2004; Wuthnow 2004). As Michael Walzer writes, “it is 
13 As mentioned above, this paper exclusively deals with political activity among members. Since 
the focus is on the role of voluntary associations in achieving participatory equality in 36 different 
countries, analysis of nonmembers is not considered. Nevertheless, it would be meaningful to briefly 
compare the effects of socioeconomic resources on political participation between members and 
nonmembers in each country because it also gives us an insight into the relationship between 
voluntary associations and participatory democracy. According to my own analyses, the incidence 
rate ratios of socioeconomic resources on political participation among members, with some 
exceptions, are lower than those among nonmembers in countries in Group I, Group II, and Group 
III. In contrast, they are higher compared to those among nonmembers in countries in Group IV. 
Thus, results moderately support my argument that participatory democracy is more likely to be 
achieved by voluntary associations as they can foster civic resources in the mind of citizens.  
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a general rule of civil society that its strongest members get stronger. The 
weaker and poorer members are either unable to organize at all – or they 
form groups that reflect their weakness and poverty” (Walzer 2002: 39). 
Archon Fung also points out, “Existing structures of interest groups 
frequently reinforce material inequality and social exclusion, and so reduce 
the quality of democratic governance on egalitarian grounds. Even as 
associations contribute to representative democracy by socializing 
individuals and teaching them political skills, they may also erode the quality 
of representation by reinforcing and exacerbating social and material 
inequalities” (Fung 2003: 530). Among Washington advocacy groups in the 
United States, businesses and industries enjoy more overrepresentation than 
any other interest (Baumgartner and Leech 1998). I agree with them. Their 
criticisms of voluntary associations, however, are not necessarily 
contradictory with the notion that greater participatory equality may prevail 
if more people organize themselves and participate in politics. Actually, their 
criticism explicitly or implicitly acknowledges that participatory democracy 
may prevail especially among those who belong to voluntary associations 
because their common membership can mitigate the influence of 
socioeconomic resources on political participation. Accordingly, findings of 
this paper may bolster rather than negate their argument in that voluntary 
associations can contribute to the quality of democratic governance on 
egalitarian grounds by altering the degree that socioeconomic resources 
determine political influences.
If most voluntary associations are built and dominated by the privileged, 
the political participation increased through associational membership will 
be songs only for “the upper class accent” and ultimately exacerbate the 
existing political. The political interests of the disadvantaged receive much 
less associational representation in politics. On the other hand, if a large 
number of voluntary associations are composed of socially, economically, and 
attitudinally mixed people or organized by relatively underrepresented 
minority groups, the story would be reversed. The question is whether we 
can calculate how disproportionate political activity of members is. How can 
we determine whether or not political activity of voluntary associations is 
biased in favor of the privileged in each country in general? Are there 
absolute criteria? I do not think that they exist. In this sense, the strategy to 
focus on the extent to which associational membership modifies the effects of 
socioeconomic resources on political participation at the individual level 
enable us effectively to show direction and degree of influence that voluntary 
associations have on participatory democracy. Furthermore, under the lack of 
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comprehensive data, I think that this is the most realistic way to diagnose the 
equalizing role of associationalism. Based on these methodological 
considerations and analysis of survey data at the individual level, as I did in 
this paper, we will be able to speculate and infer whether participatory 
democracy is being improved or deteriorated. 
Furthermore, this paper does not concern the differential effects of 
different types or kinds of associations on civic virtue and social trust. This 
paper only examines differential processes of participatory equalization 
between members and nonmembers in each country. It can be problematic 
because the effects of similar voluntary associations on participatory equality 
may vary from country to country. Therefore, future research should 
consider the potential variations in the role of the similar voluntary 
associations to participatory democracy across countries. 
Voluntary associations are neither inherently good nor inherently bad 
for political equality. Rather, their consequences for participatory democracy 
are actually dependent on their ability to develop civic resources and to drive 
citizens into political action and vary from country to country. However, it 
would be a little risky to rely fully on the existence or absence of civic 
resources to explain the distinctive difference in the role of voluntary 
associations in improving participatory democracy in all countries. There are 
always distinctive country-specific causal variables that link associational 
membership with political equality in each country. The findings presented 
in this paper can enrich our knowledge about the role of voluntary 
associations in politics and their sociological consequences in different 
societies, and will, it is hoped, stimulate further empirical research into the 
impact of voluntary associations on participatory democracy cross-nationally 
so that a more accurate view of their role is developed.
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Appendix 1: Coefficients from OLS Regression of Civic Virtue 
and Social Trust on Associational Membership and 
Socioeconomic Resources
Civic Virtue Social Trust
United States Korea United States Korea
Associational 
Membership
1.26 (0.46) *** 0.79 (0.66) 0.12 (0.04) *** 0.09 (0.05)
Socioeconomic 
Resources
    High School 
Diploma
0.47 (0.71) -0.13 (0.79) 0.19 (0.06) *** 0.15 (0.06) **
   Some College 2.34 (0.98) ** -0.33 (0.97) 0.25 (0.09) *** 0.16 (0.08) **
    College 
Graduate or 
More
2.25 (0.80) *** -0.17 (0.91) 0.38 (0.07) *** 0.20 (0.08) ***
   Second quartile 1.30 (0.67) * -0.38 (0.77) 0.14 (0.06) ** 0.07 (0.06)
   Third quartile 0.52 (0.76) -0.48 (0.83) 0.13 (0.07) ** 0.17 (0.07) **
   Top quartile 0.46 (0.76) -0.49 (0.85) 0.27 (0.07) *** 0.17 (0.07) **
    Refused/Don’t 
know
-0.03 (0.95) -0.12 (1.33) 0.18 (0.08) ** 0.17 (0.11)
Controls
   35-54 1.93 (0.51) *** 2.35 (0.69) *** 0.12 (0.05) *** -0.09 (0.06)
   55-64 2.32 (0.67) *** 4.41 (1.05) *** 0.14 (0.06) ** -0.09 (0.09)
   65 or older 3.95 (0.81) *** 3.10 (1.05) *** 0.08 (0.07) 0.06 (0.09)
   White 0.88 (0.66) NA 0.25 (0.06) *** NA
   Other Races 2.49 (1.02) ** NA 0.20 (0.09) ** NA
   Female 0.77 (0.43) * 0.68 (0.55) -0.09 (0.04) ** 0.01 (0.05)
   Married -1.25 (0.50) ** 1.10 (0.66) * -0.05 (0.04) 0.01 (0.05)
    Working 
Fulltime
0.21 (0.54) -0.91 (0.59) -0.11 (0.05) ** 0.02 (0.05)
    Working Part 
time
0.35 (0.71) 0.00 (0.98) -0.07 (0.06) 0.00 (0.08)
   Protestant 1.85 (0.65) *** 1.48 (0.65) ** 0.04 (0.06) -0.10 (0.05) *
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Civic Virtue Social Trust
United States Korea United States Korea
   Catholic 0.95 (0.71) 2.23 (0.92) ** -0.03 (0.06) -0.06 (0.07)
   Other Religion 2.02 (0.84) ** 0.55 (0.65) -0.04 (0.07) -0.11 (0.05) **
   Parental Status 0.62 (0.48) -0.06 (0.63) -0.05 (0.04) -0.02 (0.05)
   Living in South
   (Youngnam)
1.34 (0.45) *** -1.04 (0.57) * -0.05 (0.04) 0.03 (0.05)
   Big city 0.98 (0.57) * 0.05 (0.62) 0.06 (0.05) 0.02 (0.05)
   Suburbs 1.31 (0.64) ** 0.12 (0.62) 0.01 (0.06) 0.04 (0.05)
Constant 48.99 (1.22) 50.95 (1.20) 1.81 (0.11) 2.01 (0.10)
R squared 0.076 0.059 0.118 0.043
Number of cases 1318 1186 1372 1254
Note.—SEs in parentheses. 
* P<0.1, ** P<0.05, *** P<0.01, two-tailed tests. 
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Appendix 2: Coefficients from the Negative Binomial 
Regression Models of Political Acts on Socioeconomic 




High School Diploma 0.17 (0.13) -0.04 (0.18) 0.30 (0.17) *
Some College 0.48 (0.15) *** 0.06 (0.23) 0.80 (0.21) ***
College Graduate or More 0.39 (0.16) ** 0.14 (0.21) 0.54 (0.23) **
Second quartile 0.27 (0.14) * 0.14 (0.20) 0.38 (0.19) **
Third quartile 0.34 (0.14) ** 0.34 (0.20) * 0.30 (0.20)
Top quartile 0.41 (0.15) *** 0.28 (0.21) 0.52 (0.20) ***
Refused/Don’t know 0.10 (0.20) 0.17 (0.27) 0.02 (0.28)
Controls
35-54 0.13 (0.13) -0.07 (0.18) 0.32 (0.19) *
55-64 0.08 (0.15) 0.07 (0.22) 0.07 (0.22)
65 or older -0.02 (0.16) 0.06 (0.23) -0.11 (0.22)
Majority Ethnicity (Race) NA NA NA NA NA NA
Female -0.03 (0.09) 0.04 (0.13) -0.17 (0.14)
Married 0.02 (0.11) 0.08 (0.16) ** 0.01 (0.15)
Working Full time -0.04 (0.11) 0.06 (0.16) -0.21 (0.16)
Working Part time 0.09 (0.13) 0.02 (0.19) 0.17 (0.18)
Dominant Religion 1† 0.25 (0.10) *** 0.23 (0.14) * 0.26 (0.14) *
Dominant Religion 2 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Other Religion 0.41 (0.19) ** 0.21 (0.23) 0.89 (0.33) ***
Parental Status -0.17 (0.10) -0.15 (0.15) -0.17 (0.14)
Big city 0.03 (0.16) 0.03 (0.21) 0.13 (0.22)
Suburbs 0.03 (0.12) 0.00 (0.18) 0.01 (0.16)
Town 0.02 (0.10) 0.18 (0.15) -0.16 (0.15)
Civic Virtue 0.02 (0.01) *** 0.02 (0.01) ** 0.03 (0.01) ***
Social Trust 0.17 (0.06) *** 0.19 (0.09) ** 0.15 (0.09) *
Associational Membership 0.41 (0.09) ***
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All Members Non-Members
Constant -2.80 (0.39) -2.00 (0.57) -2.96 (0.55)
Over-dispersion parameter 
alpha
0.39 (0.09) 0.36 (0.11) 0.30 (0.14)
Number of cases 1158 464 694
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square 111.33 25.36 69.32
Log likelihood -1201.25 -572.67 -616.48
Note.—SEs in parentheses. 
* P<0.05, ** P<0.01, *** P<0.001, two-tailed tests. 
† Dominant Religion 1: Buddhism
